Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances.
On the night of 29-30 November, an explosion occurred on the Baikal-Amur Mainline in the Severomuysky Tunnel, named after Vladimir Bessolov, located in Buryatia (Russia). The train of jet fuel and iron ore was delayed by relay cabinet explosions.
Severomuysky Tunnel: according to the official version, the cause of the accident was a short circuit in the cable network.
Source: Ukrainska Pravda’s source in the security forces
Details: The source notes that this is actually the only major railway connection between Russia and China. And currently this route, which Russia uses, specifically for military supplies, is paralysed.
The UP source said the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) is behind this detonation.
Officially, the special service does not comment on these events.
Quote: "Four explosive devices went off during the movement of the freight train. Now the FSB is working on the spot, and railway workers are unsuccessfully trying to minimise the consequences of the SSU’s special operation."
www.pravda.com.ua/...
A recent Russian opinion poll indicates that the number of Russians who fully support the war in Ukraine has almost halved since February 2023 and that more Russians support a withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine than do not. Independent Russian opposition polling organization Chronicles stated that data from its October 17-22, 2023, telephone survey indicates that respondents who are “consistent” supporters of the war - those who expressed support for the war, do not support a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war aims, and think that Russia should prioritize military spending - decreased from 22 percent to 12 percent between February 2023 and October 2023.[1] Chronicles stated that 40 percent of respondents supported a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war aims, and that this number has remained consistent at about 39 to 40 percent throughout 2023. Chronicles stated that 33 percent of respondents did not support a Russian withdrawal and favored a continuation of the war and noted that this number has been consistently decreasing from 47 percent in February 2023 and 39 percent in July 2023. Recent polling by the independent Russian polling organization Levada Center published on October 31 indicated that 55 percent of respondents believed that Russia should begin peace negotiations whereas 38 percent favored continuing the war.[2]
The Russian war in Ukraine has created new social tensions and exacerbated existing ones within Russia, which remain highly visible in the Russian information space despite ongoing Kremlin censorship efforts. Relatives of mobilized personnel continue making widespread complaints and appeals for aid for mobilized personnel despite reported Russian efforts to censor such complaints.[3] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on November 29 that Russians have sent over 180,000 complaints about issues concerning the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to the Russian Presidential Office for Working with Citizens’ Appeals since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[4] The majority of these complaints reportedly concern payments to soldiers, mobilization status, missing persons, and poor medical care.[5] The Kremlin has also been capitalizing on recent ethnic tensions in Russia to support ongoing force generation measures and appeal to Russian ultranationalists, establishing a cycle that keeps these tensions at the forefront of ultranationalist dialogue.[6] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that protest activity and social tension are increasing in Russia, particularly in western Russia, due to the war in Ukraine and that the top echelons of Russian leadership are discussing these tensions.[7] The GUR noted that increasing crime, alcohol abuse, inflation, and high consumer goods prices also contribute to rising social tensions, and many of these factors are likely exacerbated by the continued Russian war in Ukraine.[8] The Kremlin has consistently failed to place Russian society on a wartime footing to support the Russian war effort, and the shifting poll numbers and exacerbated social tensions indicate that this failure is having a tangible effect on Russian society ahead of the 2024 Russian presidential elections.[9]
- A recent Russian opinion poll indicates that the number of Russians who fully support the war in Ukraine has almost halved since February 2023 and that more Russians support a withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine than do not.
- The Russian war in Ukraine has created new social tensions and exacerbated existing ones within Russia, which remain highly visible in the Russian information space despite ongoing Kremlin censorship efforts.
- The Kremlin is likely concerned about how changing Russian perceptions of the Russian war in Ukraine will affect the outcome of the March 2024 Russian presidential election and is implementing measures to ensure that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actual electoral support does not rest on Russian battlefield successes.
- Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov confirmed on November 30 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will hold his annual live “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14.
- Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably did not promote Kremlin information operations feigning interest in negotiations during his speech at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in North Macedonia on November 30, and instead promoted escalatory rhetoric about Moldova.
- Russian forces conducted multiple series of missile and drone strikes on Ukraine that struck civilian infrastructure on November 29 and 30.
- Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian military bureaucracy is impeding Russian drone usage and acquisition among Russian forces operating on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast amid continued complaints about weak Russian capabilities on the east bank.
- The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) was reportedly involved in an explosion that caused disruptions on a section of the East Siberian Railway connecting Russia and China on the night of November 29.
- The Kremlin continues to advance its strategic slow-burn effort to absorb Belarus through the Union State structure.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances.
- A Ukrainian military observer stated that Russian authorities’ plan to form two tank battalions in about four months using equipment from two long-term weapons and equipment stores indicates a lack of combat-ready weapons and military equipment.
- Occupation and Russian government officials continue efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth in occupied Ukraine.
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued localized offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on November 30 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled seven Russian assaults near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk), Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), and Stelmakhivka (18km northwest of Svatove).[49]
Russian forces temporarily intensified localized offensive operations near Kreminna on November 30 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Yampolivka (16km west of Kreminna), Torske (15km west of Kreminna), Terny (17km west of Kreminna), and the Serebryanske forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[51] The Ukrainian General Staff reported in its earlier situation report that Ukrainian forces repelled 24 assaults in the Lyman direction but reported only four repelled Russian assaults in the area in its later situation report for November 30.[52] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) and the new 25th Combined Arms Army resumed offensive operation in the Lyman direction to dislodge Ukrainian forces from the left bank of the Zherebets River (a tributary to the Siversky Donets River that flows into the Siversky Donets River from the north).[53] ISW has not observed evidence indicating a concerted Russian offensive effort to advance towards the Zherebets River, however.
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces reportedly made multiple advances near Bakhmut on November 30....Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces captured multiple Ukrainian positions near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), north of Khromove, and in the direction of Bohdanivka.[58] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Bohdanivka, Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and Klishchiivka.[59]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka and reportedly advanced on November 30. Russian sources claimed on November 29 and 30 that Russian forces also advanced north of the industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka and that fighting is ongoing near the Avdiivka Coke Plant and the adjacent waste heap.[64] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Stepove, Novokalynove, Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka); east of Novobakhmutivka (11km northeast of Avdiivka); and south of Tonenke (7km west of Avdiivka).[65] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that the frozen ground near Avdiivka has already softened into mud, complicating both Russian and Ukrainian forces’ ability to operate vehicles.[66] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces are conducting glide bomb strikes with Su-35 aircraft near Avdiivka.[67]
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Map of the situation on the left bank of the Dnipro river in Kherson. Ukrainian forces are said to be consolidating & advancing in the Krynky area. There are suggestions that the area south near Pishchanivka is being contested.
Russia declares the LGBTQ+ community as what it calls "the international LGBT public movement" an extremist organisation.
