- Lindsey Graham does not represent the US position when he says: “I’m not helping Ukraine until we help ourselves.”
- Republicans in House are blockading the aid Ukraine needs.
- The Republican party will be responsible if Ukraine runs out of ammunition. Directly responsible.
“Look, we are not backing down, I am satisfied. We are fighting with the second [best] army in the world, I am satisfied. We are losing people, I’m not satisfied. We didn’t get all the weapons we wanted, I can’t be satisfied, but I also can’t complain too much,” explained Zelenskyy.
The long-awaited counteroffensive, powered by Western military aid, failed to achieve anticipated breakthroughs. Simultaneously, dwindling ammunition supplies pose a risk of halting Ukrainian battlefield operations. As winter approaches, bringing freezing temperatures and exposed soldiers, military leaders face renewed challenges, including the threat of Russian aerial assaults targeting energy infrastructure and civilians in cities.
euromaidanpress.com/...
The Ukrainian army had just four tank brigades before the 5th Tank finally mobilized. While most of the Ukrainian armed forces’ hundred or so ground-combat brigades have at least a few tanks—normally a company or battalion, respectively with a dozen or 30 tanks—only the tank brigades concentrate a lot of tanks under a single command.
The concentration of mobile, protected firepower makes the tank brigades some of the most effective brigades for intensive close combat. In particular, offensive combat.
When Russian field armies rolled toward Kyiv in the early weeks of the wider war, the Ukrainian 1st Tank Brigade circled its wagons—so to speak—in Chernihiv, 60 miles north of the capital. There, it fought off a much larger Russian force. The brigade’s T-64BV tanks proved particularly lethal in close fights with Russian tanks.
But Ukrainian tank doctrine has evolved as the wider war has slowed to a mostly positional conflict, with both sides struggling to achieve major breakthroughs across heavily-mined defensive lines buzzing with explosives-laden drones.
More and more, tanks fight at range—staging a mile or two from the front line and firing their main guns at high angles, like howitzers do. “The value of this technique is that it allows tanks to concentrate fire over a wide area while they can maneuver without the protection and screening needed by artillery pieces,” the Royal United Services Institute noted in a 2022 study.
As it happens, Ukraine’s large fleet of donated Leopard 1s are suited to this indirect-fire role, owing to their accurate and fast fire-controls and effective 105-millimeter main guns. More to the point, the Leopard 1s are thinly-protected, with barely half the armor that T-72s have. The Leopard 1s should fight at range because they lack the protection for close fights.
www.msn.com/...
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces repelled small Ukrainian infantry assaults near Robotyne and Novoprokopivka (3km south of Robotyne) and northwest of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).
Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes on the night of December 2 and 3. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 12 Shahed drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and one Kh-59 missile from Belgorod Oblast and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 10 of the drones over Mykolaiv and Khmelnytskyi oblasts as well as the Kh-59 missile.[21] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched the drones in waves.[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian aviation, drones, missiles, and artillery struck a Ukrainian command post in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; fuel depots near Myrhorod, Poltava Oblast and Khmelnytskyi City; and an ammunition depot in Mykolaiv Oblast.[23]
www.understandingwar.org/...
In modern Russia, imperial revanchism is demonstrably good politics. Maintaining the “Putin’s War’ narrative is either cynical or ignorant.
Meanwhile, Russia launched at least 12 drones and a cruise missile at Ukraine on Saturday night, with air defence systems destroying 10 drones before they reached their targets, according to Kyiv’s air force.
The cruise missile was not destroyed but did not reach its target, the air force said on Sunday, without giving further details.
The statement also did not clarify what happened to the two drones that were not destroyed.
“10 out of 12 is a perfect score. These are good results that we see every day,” Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat told national television.
The Iranian-made Shahed drones were headed towards Ukraine’s northwest, the air force said. Most were downed in the Mykolaiv region in Ukraine’s south.
The air force’s report could not be independently verified and there was no immediate comment from Russia.
Regional officials confirmed the attack but said they had no information on casualties or damage.
Ukraine is preparing for new and intensified waves of Russian attacks on infrastructure as winter approaches.
Last winter, about 10 months into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow made waves of attacks on power stations and other plants linked to the energy network, prompting rolling blackouts in widely separated regions.
www.aljazeera.com/...
- Russian President Vladimir Putin’s December 1 decree is likely a formal recognition of the Russian military’s current end strength and not an order to immediately increase the number of Russian military personnel.
- Ukrainian air defense coverage along the front line is reportedly incentivizing Russian forces to rely more heavily on remote strikes with glide bombs.
- Ukrainian officials appealed to international organizations to investigate video footage published on December 2 showing Russian forces killing surrendering and reportedly unarmed Ukrainian soldiers.
- Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes on the night of December 2 and 3.
- The Russian government is likely continuing attempts to censor relatives of mobilized Russian military personnel on social media out of concern about their protests’ possible negative effect on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s still unannounced 2024 presidential campaign.
- A prominent Russian milblogger claimed to have given a “masterclass” to press heads and communications personnel at Russian stated-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, likely in support of an effort that allows the Russian government to normalize the war without directly involving the Kremlin.
- The milblogger’s “masterclass” represents an avenue by which the Kremlin can further benefit from milbloggers and shows how possible financial incentives could temper milbloggers’ criticisms of the Russian leadership.
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Avdiivka.
- Russia continues to use the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) to indoctrinate Russian children into Russian nationalism and set conditions for long-term force generation efforts.
- Russian occupation officials continue to strengthen the Kremlin-backed United Russia party in occupied Ukraine ahead of the March 2024 Russian presidential elections.
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 3 but did not make confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks northeast of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (20km southwest of Kupyansk), Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove), and the Serebryanske forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[35] ...The Russian “Russkiy Legion" (BARS-13) irregular armed formation claimed that Russian forces attacked south of Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna).[38] Footage published on December 3 purportedly shows elements of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) operating near Berestove (30km south of Kreminna).[39]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka on December 3 and recently made confirmed advances. Footage published on November 28 and geolocated on December 2 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of the railway north of Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka).[49] Additional geolocated footage published on December 2 indicates that Russian forces advanced southwest of Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka).[50] ... The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked east of Novobakhmutivka (9km northwest of Avdiivka) and Novokalynove; south of Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka); and near Stepove, Avdiivka, Sieverne, and Pervomaiske.[53] Russian sources claimed on December 3 that Russian forces also attacked on the northern flank from Kamianka (5km northeast of Avdiivka) and on the southern flank near the industrial zone southwest of Avdiivka.[54] ...Ukrainian Avdiivka Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash stated on December 3 that Russian forces opened two additional directions of attack on the industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka and from Spartak (4km south of Avdiivka) during the third wave of assaults on Avdiivka in order to distract Ukrainian forces.[56] Barabash also stated that Russian forces are waiting for weather conditions to improve in order to use heavy equipment in assaults again.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut on December 3 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued assault actions south of Bakhmut.[42] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[43]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut but did not make any confirmed advances on December 3. Russian sources claimed on December 2 that Russian forces advanced south of the Berkhivka reservoir (about 2km northwest of Bakhmut), towards Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), east of Klishchiivka, and near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Bohdanivka, Ivanivske, Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.[45] ...Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that the “Shustryi” detachment of the Chechen ”Akhmat” Spetsnaz and elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Luhansk People‘s Republic [LNR] 2nd Army Corps) are operating near Klishchiivka.[48]